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PART ONE 
Introduction 
 
The world is fast running out of usable water. Anthropogenic activities are polluting and depleting this finite 
wellspring of life at a startling rate. Industrialization, intensive agriculture, pollution, deforestation, and 
construction of large dams have damaged the earth’s surface water in persistent ways. Quite simply, unless we 
change our ways and practices the world will be living with freshwater shortages in the coming future. 
Keeping in view the increasing demand for water, the government of India developed a new National 
Water Policy, which states that “water is a prime natural resource, a basic need and a precious national asset. 
Planning, development, and management of water resources need to be governed by national perspectives” 
(National Water Policy 2002). 
While there exists excellent literature on different alternatives to water management since independence 
(Hemphill and Bramley 1989; Chambers 1988; Shukla and Vandana 1996; Agarwal, Narain, and Khurana 
2001), the national perspective guiding water resource development in India has focused on a supply-based 
paradigm as the only alternative to meet water needs for such diverse purposes as irrigation, drinking water, 
sanitation, industrial and other uses in a sustainable manner. The policy decision to interlink its rivers 
announced by the government of India for managing fresh water resources in the twenty-first century is based 
on a linear model of bureaucratic decision-making and its subsequent stages of implementation. This top-down 
solution to India’s growing water needs has stirred controversy and debate in one of the world’s largest 
democracies. This paper addresses the challenges inherent in the government’s policy decision to interlink 
rivers as envisaged by the bureaucratic agency of state power, a culture of scientific expertise, a perceived need 
to mobilize global capital, and the opposition to such plans engendered by the agency of civil society in a bid to 
examine how different actors conceptualize the project through a discursive approach.  
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PART TWO 
Historical Background 
 
The idea of linking rivers for various purposes in the sub-continent is not new. Sir Arthur Cotton conceived a 
plan to link rivers in Southern India for inland navigation in the nineteenth century. While the project was 
partially implemented, the river-linking canals could not survive the decline of water navigation in the face of 
rapid development of railways. Capt. Dinshaw J. Dastur advanced a proposal for the “Garland Canal” system 
that consisted of two canals: (1) the Himalayan Canal and (2) the Central and Southern Garland Canal. They 
were to be interconnected at two points—Delhi and Patna. Central Water Commission studies carried out in 
1979 indicated that the project was impracticable, technically unsound, and economically prohibitive. The cost 
was estimated to be about twelve million crores in rupees (about 2.6 trillion U.S. dollars) and the scheme was 
eventually given up.* 
The idea of a Ganga-Cauvery Link was proposed by Dr. K.L. Rao, former Union Minister for Irrigation, in 
1975. It envisaged a link taking off near Patna, passing through the watersheds of the Sone, Narmada, Tapi, 
Godavari, Krishna, and Pennar rivers, and joining the Cauvery up-stream of Grand Anicut. The link was to 
traverse 2,640 km and involved a lift of water 450 meters from the flood flows of the Ganga, withdrawing 
60,000 cusecs (60,000 cubic feet per second) of water for 150 days in a year (Iyer 2002). The plan floundered, 
as it involved an estimated cost of Rs. 12,500 crores ($2.7 billion) and required a large energy consumption to 
operate its pumps. The Central Water Commission examined this proposal and found its costs to be grossly 
underestimated. While the proposal was not pursued as such, it still lingers in the minds of people in times of 
scarcity of water as a possible resolution to the continuing dispute over Cauvery River water between the states 
of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka.  
The persistent interest by many people sustains the impetus to study inter-basin water transfer proposals. 
The then-Ministry of Irrigation (now the Ministry of Water Resources) formulated a plan for “National 
Perspectives for Water Development” in August 1980 (Ministry of Water Resources 1980). This led to the 
establishment of the National Water Development Agency (NWDA) in 1982 to study basin-wide surpluses and 
deficits and explore the possibilities for storage, links, and transfers of water. Its broad approach, utilizing a 
national perspective to evaluate hydrologic resources, was the basis for a plan based on optimum development 
of available storage sites, including development of new storages wherever feasible, and the interlinking of 
major rivers.  
For the scientific development of water resources, the Ministry of Water Resources considered it necessary 
that each river basin/sub-basin should be analyzed as a unit. Maximizing the availability of water through inter-
basin transfers would give much needed relief to water-deficient areas, distributing the benefits more evenly 
throughout the nation. The assumption is that integrated development of both surface and ground water can 
optimize benefits, resulting in the most economical use of water. The NWDA carried out detailed studies, 
identified thirty potential links between watersheds for the preparation of feasibility reports, and prepared 
feasibility studies of six such links. It produced documentation with special reference to the Himalayan and 
peninsular rivers.   
The Himalayan Component envisaged transfer of water from the Brahmaputra and Ganga system 
westwards to southern Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Punjab, and Rajasthan, and eventually to the southwest 
Peninsular Component. The Peninsular Rivers Component deals with connecting Mahanadi, Godavari, Krishna, 
Pennar and Cauvery, Ken-Betwa, Parbati-Kalisindh-Chambal, Par-Tapi-Narmada, Damanganga-Pinjal, etc. 
There was also a notion for partial eastward diversion of certain rivers flowing into the Arabian Sea, linking 
them with rivers flowing into the Bay of Bengal. However, before treading into a controversial area, certain 
facts about water will give a better understanding of the issue in question.
                                                           
* Twelve million crores in rupees is equivalent to 120 trillion rupees (1 crore = 10 million). The exchange rate used to arrive 
at the approximate U.S. dollar equivalent here and elsewhere in the paper is 1 U.S. dollar = 45.6 Indian rupees. 
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 PART THREE 
Facts about Water 
 
Despite opulent precipitation of 4,000 cubic km annually over India, 3,000 cubic km of the total is confined to 
the four months of monsoon, with the remaining 1,000 cubic km falling in the remaining eight months of the 
year. Even this precipitation is uneven. Parts of the country have abundant precipitation and others face extreme 
water deficits. The bulk of water during the monsoon washes into the oceans unused. Annual water resources of 
the country are measured in terms of run-off in the river systems, estimated by the National Commission as 
1,953 cubic km. However, the utilizable resources of the country are 690 cubic km of surface water and 396 
cubic km of ground water (Ministry of Water Resources 1999a).  
Profligate consumption of the limited supply of water is the most pervasive and persistent problem to 
contain, accompanied by anomalies of mismanagement and the failure of the population to embrace 
conservation of this vital resource. The problem of storage is exacerbated by a faulty distribution system, 
differences in consumption, leakage and evaporation, and consumer wastage. The present ineffective 
management of water ignores the potential of conservation and embraces the chimeric alternative of increasing 
supply. Degraded watersheds, drying local pond systems, shrinking canal networks, and wetland degradation as 
a result of anthropogenic activity and climate change relegate water to the status of “scarce commodity.” The 
ever-increasing stress caused by population growth and concomitant increased agricultural and industrial 
demands for water have created an apparent scenario of water shortage that requires augmentation. Figure 1 
below describes the distribution of water resources for the years 1974 (actual) and 2025 (projected).  
Figure 1: Distribution of Average Annual Water Resources 1974 and 2025 (million hectare meters) 
(Note: Figures in parentheses are projected figures for the year 2025) 
Four monsoon months
        300 (300)
Eight remaining months
           100 (100)
Total precipitation
        400 (400)
 Immediate
evaporation
  from soil
   70 (70)
SURFACE WATER
         115 (115)
To soil moisture
      165 (165)
From irrigation
        5 (5)
Total soil moisture
       170 (180)
To groundwater
       50 (50)
From streams
     5 (10)
From irrigation
       12 (25)
Total groundwater
         67 (85)
From rainfall
   105 (105)
From snowfall
      10 (10)
From outside India
     +20 (+20)
To groundwater from
       flood flows
          -5 (-10)
From groundwater
      +45 (+45)
From irrigation areas
          +5 (+15)
Total surface flows
         180 (185)
Total utilization
       38 (105)
NOTE : Figures in bracket are projected figures for the year 2025
Source : B.S.Nag and G.N.Kathpalia 1975, water resource of India, in water  and human needs, proceedings of the second world congress on
              water resources, control board of Irrigation and Power, New Delhi.
 
Source: B.S. Nag and G.N. Kathpalia, “Water Resources of India,” in Water and Human Needs: Proceedings of  
the Second World Congress on Water Resources (New Delhi: Control Board of Irrigation and Power, 1975). 
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The simulations of utilizable water scenarios up to 2050 as calculated by the Ministry of Water Resources 
are given in Table 1 and 2. These provide a snap shot of the existing and future scenarios. The utilizable surface 
water and ground water remains 690 km3 and 396 km3 under both low and high demand scenarios. 
Table 1: Utilizable Water 
Quantity in km3 = billion cubic meters (BCM) 
Particular 1997–98 2010 2025 2050 
Utilizable Water  Low 
Demand 
High 
Demand 
Low 
Demand 
High 
Demand 
Low 
Demand 
High 
Demand 
a. Utilizable 
Surface Water 
690 690 690 690 690 690 690 
b. Utilizable 
Ground Water 
396 396 396 396 396 396 396 
c. Existing 
Augmentation 
from Canal 
Irrigation 
90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
Total of (a+b) 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086 
Source: Ministry of Water Resources, Govt. of India 1999 
However, total water requirement and return flow are steadily rising in future in terms of the national average, 
basin studies, and state studies. Return flow follows similar trends. The data shows a corresponding decline in 
residual utilizable water, as demonstrated in Table 2 (opposite page). 
The assumptions made in the report of the National Commission on Integrated Water Resource 
Development (NCIWRD) concluded that availability of water as calculated in 1997 is 520 BCM and estimated 
demand for water in 2025 will be 784 BCM in a low growth scenario and 843 BCM in a high growth scenario. 
The steadily rising demand curve shows no signs of decline up to 2025. Unless population control measures, 
greater efficiency of use of water as a resource, and new technologies like desalinization and conversion of 
marine water into fresh water are accomplished, beyond 2025 water demand will keep soaring. The total 
requirement in the year 2050 under a low usage scenario will be 973 BCM, while the total requirement in the 
year 2050 under a high scenario will be 1,180 BCM (Ministry of Water Resources 1999b). 
In these scenarios, where supply will barely meet demand, the National Commission noted that the 
situation will not become a crisis if steps are taken in advance. Water availability needs to be enhanced from the 
present 520 BCM, but population growth has to be contained to the low demand scenario of 2050 to match 
requirements, along with optimal development of utilizable water resources in the country. If water 
requirements reach those projected under a high demand scenario, the estimated resource availability will 
simply not be able to match the demand of 1,180 BCM. 
A word about the Water Barrier concept of Sustainability will not be out of place here. The water stress 
index, as calculated by M. Falkenmark (1989), is based on the annual water resources (AWR) per capita. The 
AWR of 1,700 cubic meters (CM) indicates only occasional and local stress; 1,000 CM indicates a condition of 
stress; and 500 CM or less means seriously constrained water scarcity. Thus India may not be facing a water 
scarcity condition even at the end of 2025 on average at the national level, but conditions of scarcity will exist 
in four river basins of India (see Figure 2 on page 22). East flowing rivers between Mahanadi and Pennar, east 
flowing rivers between Pennar and Kanyakumari, and west flowing rivers of Kutch and Kathiawar, including 
the Luni and Sabarmati, all face a per capita availability of less than 1,000 CM per year.  
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Table 2: Utilizable Water, Requirement and Return Flow 
(Quantity in km3) (BCM) 
S. No. Particulars Year Year 2010 Year 2025 Year 2050 
2. Total Water Requirement based on:         
a. National Average: Surface water 399 447 458 497 545 641 754 
 Ground water 230 247 252 287 298 332 428 
 Total 629 694 710 784 843 973 1180 
b. Basin Study: Surface water   Not  Assessed  642 751 
 Ground water   Not  Assessed    
 Total   Not Assessed    
c. State Study Surface water  448 457 496 546 641 751 
 Ground water  246 251 287 297 332 427 
 Total  694 708 783 843 973 1178 
3. Return Flow based on:         
a. National Average Surface water 43 52 52 70 74 91 104 
 Ground water 143 144 148 127 141 122 155 
 Total 186 196 200 197 215 213 259 
b. Basin Study Surface water   Not  Assessed  93 107 
 Ground water   Not  Assessed  148 186 
 Total   Not Assessed  241 293 
c. State Study Surface water  52 53 70 75 92 104 
 Ground water  145 148 128 141 122 155 
 Total  197 201 198 216 214 259 
4. Residual Utilizable Water 
    (4 =1-1©-2+3) Balance based on: 
        
a. National Average Surface water 334 295 284 263 219 140 42 
 Ground water 219 203 202 146 149 96 33 
 Total 553 498 486 409 368 236 75 
b. Basin Study: Surface water   Not  Assessed  141 46 
 Ground water   Not  Assessed  123 63 
 Total   Not Assessed  264 109 
c. State Study:  Surface water  294 286 264 219 141 43 
 Ground water  205 203 147 150 96 34 
 Total  499 489 411 369 237 77 
Source: Ministry of Water Resources, 1999 
Note: The total utilizable water resources do not take into account a likely reduction in utilizable surface 
water resources due to reservoir sedimentation, which is estimated to be about 17 percent of the total live 
storage capacity by year 2050. 
 
In addition to the spatial availability of water, the impending crisis in water is also due to inadequate water 
management and environmental degradation, rampant pollution, lack of efficiency in water use, and inadequate 
attention to conservation. Admittedly, water scarcity to some extent is a social construct, in spite of seasonal 
and temporal variations of water availability as reflected in the basic compilation of water demands and yields. 
It was this background that caused the National Commission on Integrated Water Resource Development 
(Ministry of Water Resources 1999b) to observe that optimal utilization of land and water should be aimed at 
fully exploiting intra-basin surpluses before considering inter-basin transfers. The commission did not discuss in 
detail the Himalayan Component as data on the Himalayan Rivers is classified as confidential. NWDA’s 
Himalayan Component thus requires more detailed study and the actual implementation is unlikely to be 
undertaken in the immediate future. In the case of the peninsular rivers, after careful examination of the water 
balances in the various basins, the commission observed that there was no imperative need for massive water 
transfers. The assessed needs could be met with more efficient utilization of intra-basin resources, except in 
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case of Cauvery and Vaigai basins where limited water transfers could take place by transferring water from 
Godavari River. 
Despite this report, plans were floated to combat water deficits by conveying surpluses to water deficient 
locations. Various political parties and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) members in Tamil Nadu felt that linking 
river water resources could enhance the realization of water needs. These political pressures pushed the 
proposal forward, leading to a Supreme Court direction to the government of India demanding that the 
government take steps to interlink certain major rivers of the country by the year 2012, spelling the beginning of 
the “Interlinking of Rivers Project” (see figure 3 on page 23). 
Proposed River Links  
The interlinking river project is separated into two primary components (see discussion of the Himalayan and 
Peninsular Rivers Components at http://wrmin.nic.in/interbasin/perspective.htm). The Himalayan Component 
proposes fourteen canals (Table 3) and the Peninsular Component sixteen (Table 4, opposite). In the Himalayan 
Component, many dams are slated for construction on tributaries of the Ganga and Brahmaputra in India, 
Nepal, and Bhutan. The project intends to link the Brahmaputra and its tributaries with the Ganga and the 
Ganga with the Mahanadi River to transfer surplus water from east to west. The scheme envisages flood control 
in the Ganga and Brahmaputra basins and a reduction in water deficits for many states. 
 Table 3: Links Identified in Himalayan Component 
 
1. Kosi - Mechi 
2. Kosi - Ghagra 
3. Gandak - Ganga 
4. Ghagra - Yamuna 
5. Sarda - Yamuna 
6. Yamuna - Rajasthan 
7. Rajasthan - Sabarmati 
8. Chunar - Sone barrage 
9. Sone dam - Southern tributaries of Ganga 
10. Brahmaputra - Ganga (Manas - Sankosh - Tista - Ganga 
11. Brahmaputra - Ganga (Jogigopa - Tista - Farakka) 
12. Farakka - Sunderbans 
13. Farakka - Damodar - Subarnrkha 
14. Subernarekha - Mahanadi 
Source: “National Perspective Plan,” NWDA (1980), and Goyal (2003) 
In the Peninsular Component, river interlinks are envisaged to benefit the states of Orissa, Karnataka, 
Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Pondicherry, and Maharashtra. The linkage of the Mahanadi and Godavari rivers is 
proposed to feed the Krishna, Pennar, Cauvery, and Vaigai rivers. Transfer of water from Godavari and Krishna 
entails pumping 1,200 cusecs of water over a crest of about 116 meters. Interlinking the Ken with the Betwa, 
Parbati, Kalisindh, and Chambal rivers is proposed to benefit Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan.  
The river link network envisages knitting together ten major rivers across the nation, unheard of in human 
history. The project is likely to alter the geography of the country, impose ecological risks, and also 
inadvertently distribute pollutant loads across the rivers, spreading local contamination problems and raising 
questions of accountability for sources of pollution. Recurrent droughts and incessant water shortages are 
looked upon as an opportunity to put aside these forgotten problems. While the reasons for drying up of the 
Sabarmati remain unaccounted for, diverting the waters of Narmada 225 km upstream has restored its flow. The 
Sabarmati recorded an average annual flow of 3,200 cubic meters, instead of creating conditions for recharge in 
the 21,674 sq km of its watershed. The assumption op. cit. is based on good rains in Madhya Pradesh providing 
enough water to Narmada for sharing it with Sabarmati. The Sabarmati today has been reduced to a canal 
dependent on Narmada. 
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Table 4: Links Identified in Peninsular Component 
 
1. Mahanadi (Manibhadra) - Godavari (Dowlaiswaram) 
2. Godavari (Inchampalii) - Krishna (Nagarjunasagar) 
3. Godavari (Inchampalii Low dam) - Krishna (Nagarjuna Tail Pond) 
4. Godavari (Polavaram) - Krishna (Vijayawada) 
5. Krishna (Almatti) - Pennar 
6. Krishna (Srisailam) - Pennar (Prodattur) 
7. Krishna (Nagarjunasagar) - Pennar (Sornasila) 
8. Pennar (Sornasila) - Cauvery (Grand Arnicut) 
9. Cauvery (Kattaiai) - Vaigai - Gundur 
10. Ken - Betwa - Link 
11. Parbati - Kalisindh - Chambal 
12. Par - Tapi Narmada 
13. Damanganga - Pinjal 
14. Bedti - Varda 
15. Netravati - Hemavati 
16. Pamba - Achankovil - Vappar 
Source: “National Perspective Plan,” NWDA (1980), and Goyal (2003) 
Budget and Cost Estimates 
The estimated cost (in 2002) of interlinking rivers stands at Rs. 5,60,000 crores (Goyal 2003)—equivalent to 
approximately $122.7 billion—with an annual outlay over thirty-five years of Rs. 16,000 crores ($3.5 billion). 
Another estimate puts it close to 5,56,000 crores ($121.8 billion), out of which Rs. 3,30,000 crores ($72.3 
billion) is earmarked for linking the Himalayan rivers with the various peninsular rivers (Sharma 2003). The 
Central Government is estimated to need Rs. 20,000 crores ($4.4 billion) a year to execute the project (Goyal 
2003). Gujja (2003) estimates Rs. 5,50,000 crores ($120.5 billion) as the cost of completing what would be the 
largest civil engineering project ever in India. As a long term project, the actual inflation and potential cost 
increases during such a long span are anybody’s guess. Long term planning and a sound financial simulation are 
required to meet the standard of due diligence for such proposals. 
Table 5: Main Budgetary and Other Features of the River Interlinking Plan 
 
1. Estimated cost at 2002 price level Rs. 5,60,000 crores ($122.7 billion) 
2. Annual financial outlay Rs. 16,000 crores ($3.5 billion) 
3. Number of links 30 
4. Independent links 21 
5. Interdependent links 9 
6. Countries involved India, Nepal, and Bhutan 
Based on Goyal (2003) 
Yet, the government seems ready to commit this huge expenditure mostly because of popular sentiment. 
The economic viability of the project remains questionable. Technical feasibility studies have yet to be carried 
out. Raising Rs. 33,000 crores ($7.2 billion) each year over ten years is by no means a small task as this amount 
is twice that of current annual tax collections.  
Proponents of the river linking project argue that water scarcity or surplus is a result of extreme conditions 
of flood or drought that are at the mercy of the vagaries of natural precipitation. To some extent, the scarcity of 
water could be overcome by harvesting water locally, but such a strategy cannot solve the national problem of 
uneven distribution of hydrologic resources. Local watershed developments are viable as stand alone projects, 
since effective conservation of water is possible only at local levels. In supporting the plan, the National Water 
Development Agency affirms that it will provide water to irrigate 35 million hectares of farmland and supply 34 
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million kilowatts of hydroelectricity (http://www.wrmin.nic.in/interbasin/perspective.htm). From the basic 
compilation of water demands and yields, a National Water Grid seems imperative and the interlinking of rivers 
necessary to foster equitable water transfers from “surplus” to “scarce” basins of India. In addition to 
transferring water from surplus to deficit areas, the scheme to interlink rivers also presumes that water will be 
stored and released at the optimal time and place, bringing its availability under human control. It is asserted 
that the scheme would provide protection from floods and droughts, while also promoting the availability of 
water for nature, agriculture, and industry (Jhunjhunwala 2002). In addition to construction of dams and 
barrages, it would promote generation of hydro-electricity, which is linked with industrial growth and quality of 
life measurements. 
To its opponents, the river interlinking project has been looked upon as an a priori proposition that 
undermines conservation of a scarce resource; signals a return to centralized, bureaucratic projects prone to 
failure; is potentially fraught with serious environmental consequences; was announced in advance of standard 
review procedures of scientific evaluation, appraisal, and approval; and represents a distortion of priorities, pre-
empting resources and attention from other social projects that are a higher priority (Iyer 2002). The National 
Commission on Integrated Water Resource Development Plan (Ministry of Water Resources 1999b) 
commented, “there seems to be no imperative necessity for massive water transfers. The assessed needs of 
basins could be met from full development and efficient utilization of intra-basin resources except in the case of 
Cauvery and Vaigai basins. Therefore, it is felt that limited water transfers from Godavari at Khampalli and 
Polavarum towards South would take care of the deficit in Cauvery and Vaigai basins.” The Commission noted 
that further studies of inter-basin transfers need to be undertaken to clarify the true costs, benefits, and 
drawbacks of such massive projects. 
In the Himalayan context, the Commission found the river linking project’s implementation is unlikely to 
be undertaken because of the huge expenditures and environmental problems involved. Furthermore, its 
expansion into the deserts of Rajasthan needs more detailed study (Ministry of Water Resources 1999b). 
Besides the above problems, transfers from the Manas, Sankosh, and Kamali rivers need concurrence from 
Bhutan, and those from the Brahmaputra and Ganga require agreement with Bangladesh.  
While history does offer examples of international joint ventures negating the thorny issues of territorial 
boundaries and submerging conflicting interests into settlements with mutual benefits, the ecological and social 
costs of these massive projects cannot be ignored. A 179 km Grand Canal was built nearly 3,500 years ago by 
the Chinese, from Beijing in the North extending to Hangzhou in the South, connecting the Haihe, Huaihe, 
Yangtze, and Qiantang Rivers. Construction began in the fifteenth century BC and the canal became the main 
artery of communication in China during the seventh to thirteenth centuries AD. The Suez Canal was opened in 
1869, linking the Red Sea with the Mediterranean. Some fish species of Red Sea origin passed through the canal 
and proliferated into the eastern Mediterranean, fostering ecological transmigration and displacement of the 
original fish species. The impacts of such transmigrations are unknown and impose uncertain ecological risks.  
Another example, the Panama Canal, takes water from a river basin in the center of the Isthmus, feeding 
locks that carry ships between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. This arrangement is dependent on water 
availability from the basin. Since the output of the watershed during the dry season is not enough to support 
transfer of ships throughout the year, an artificial lake, Lake Gatun, was created, serving as a buffer to 
overcome dry periods. Still, deforestation and negative agricultural impacts are affecting the functioning of the 
lake, threatening the viability of the canal. Any human endeavor on such a scale is an artificial intervention in 
the ecology, whether it is interlinking of rivers, harvesting rain, making dams, or afforestation. The decisions on 
such infringements need to be taken on the basis of a strict social, environmental, and economic costs and 
benefits analysis. 
Proposals to interlink the rivers of India also entail massive economic, ecological, and social costs. At the 
time K.L. Rao first proposed the project decades ago, these watersheds had more water, less pollution, lesser 
deforestation, and floods that were not so severe or frequent as now. Since then, the Indian population has 
increased enormously; efforts to aid those afflicted by the problems of displacement and rehabilitation that 
inevitably accompany such projects must be taken as a prerequisite. Increasingly, the entire socio-economic 
strata of affected people are more aware of their rights and know how to protest, agitate, and demand their due. 
Such changed circumstances are bound to create impediments to the execution of the project and offer stiff 
resistance to it. The involvement of global capital will have its own complications. In recent years, popular 
awareness, participation, and empowerment in evaluation of such projects has created an awareness of the 
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merits and demerits they offer, along with recognition of alternative solutions. These conditions present a 
number of challenges. 
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PART FOUR  
Challenges Facing the Project 
 
In an era of scientific and technological advancement, it seems imperative to consider the implications of a shift 
towards a supply-driven investment paradigm aimed primarily at asset creation. But the trend towards a 
demand-driven alternative which encourages holistic, integrated investment that promotes efficient and 
productive use of water also needs to be considered at the decision making levels. Does this underpinning 
dictum seem negated in the interlinking river project? Have alternative choices of efficient management of 
water use, development of watersheds, harvesting otherwise wasted water, adoption of water conserving 
agricultural practices, and recycling of industrial water been tested and found unsuitable? Are institutional 
mechanisms that allocate water equitably in social, sustainable, and economic terms working efficiently? Will 
the involvement of global capital lead ultimately to commodification of water? Can supply side augmentation as 
advocated by experts solve water scarcity problems? In fact, such mind-boggling questions bear examination of 
the deeply embedded background of cultural, social and scientific practices that are the dominant mode of 
thought and action in matters of policy-making and scientific expertise. 
The Culture of Expert Knowledge 
The culture of expert knowledge was fostered by the need of governments for more technical information as 
well as identification of biases in data from non-governmental sources. Scientific and engineering knowledge 
occupies a central position in solving the problems and challenges facing the world today. However, scientists 
and engineers practice their trade through an inherited set of beliefs and practices—a framework within which 
they tend to function. The way scientists and engineers view the world seems severely bounded by particular 
interpretations of reality that Kuhn calls paradigms. Paradigm-based research is an attempt to force nature into 
the pre-formed and relatively inflexible framework that the paradigm supplies. These paradigms govern, in the 
first instance, not subject matter but rather a group of practitioners (Kuhn 1996). Since it is difficult, even 
impossible, to see any more than a tiny slice of reality, people depend on interpretations, paradigms, and 
mythologies to understand the world (Sarawitz 1996). 
In the river interlinking case, the standard engineering response to the temporal and spatial variations in the 
availability of water speaks of the intellectual paradigm scientists and engineers work within. This view holds 
that projected future demands can be met by a supply side solution in the form of large dams and reservoirs for 
storage, to hold water for release during arid seasons, and projects using long distance water transfers from 
surplus areas to water-short ones. Guided by this ruling paradigm, science and technology continues to 
prescribe more technological growth to correct the consequences of previous growth. The planners nurse the 
notion that the solution to temporal and spatial water availability is increased supply for increased demand. But 
the consequences of such supply-based paradigms are unknown. “The real environment is altogether too big, 
complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal with so much subtlety, so much 
variety, so many permutations and combinations” (Lippmann 1922).  
The way the engineering mindset views the world determines the way it maps its solution. The river-linking 
project speaks of the intellectual beliefs inherent in the engineering mindset that knowledge and innovation of 
this kind will unfold the secrets of nature and successfully address crucial challenges of water availability facing 
Indian society, thereby creating social benefit. This outlook heavily conditions the worldview of expert 
knowledge, affecting macro conceptions about nature. The rules and standards set by these experts in India are 
based on the supply side paradigm that has dominated such thinking over the past few decades, in spite of 
growing opposition to it by civic activists and environmentalists. 
The role of most of the scientific community, therefore, remains questionable given the intellectual 
baggage that they have been carrying with them for years in supporting the project as a beneficial one, meeting 
societal needs. The role of these experts is to a great extent influenced by their own ways of conceiving and 
approaching problems, their own particular attitudes and modes of behavior built into the positions they occupy. 
The professional position affects the way a professional looks at a problem. 
The government of India formed a task force to evaluate the project, comprised of experts from science, 
engineering, economics, and social sciences and including as official stakeholders one member from a water 
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deficit state and one member from a water surplus state (http://wrmin.nic.in/interbasin/perspective.htm). The 
task force was constituted by the government to address the following broad issues: provide guidance for norms 
of appraisal of individual projects vis-à-vis their economic viability, socio-economic impacts, environmental 
impacts, and preparation of resettlement plans; develop a mechanism for speedy consensus amongst states; 
prioritize different projects; propose organizational structures for implementing the project; consider funding 
modalities for the project; and consider the international ramifications of the project. The completion date for 
achieving the goal of the interlinking project is December 31, 2016 (Ministry of Water Resources 2002b). 
But once the government has announced a political decision, can we then trust the task force experts to be 
objective in reviewing their decision-making? Can technical agencies like the Central Water Commission, the 
technical advisory committee, the Ministry of Environment and Forests, its committees, and the river linking 
task force objectively examine the project? Water resource projects of this nature are part of the kind of 
development that will not only tend to redraw the physical map of Indian rivers by technological and scientific 
knowledge, but also herald us into an era of unforeseen disasters as a result of tampering with natural 
ecosystems that are complex and about which very little is known of the interactions of their component forces 
on a long term transformational basis (Perrow 1999).  
Technological expertise may push forward this proposal, but the fallibility of these systems cannot be 
ignored in such a mega project as this. The responsibility then rests with these experts. Whether they can move 
out of the supply-based paradigm of mega projects in spite of the looming uncertainty of risks imposed on 
society and nature remains a difficult question to answer. The science policy paradigm as envisaged by S. 
Jasanoff (1990) in the American case study holds true for the Indian scenario, too. She argues that despite the 
growing use of advisory committees in regulatory science, their influence is limited by a system where politics 
and law prevails. The argument that agencies are often permitted to make regulatory decisions on the basis of 
imperfect knowledge is validated by the government’s decision to announce this project, quickly followed by 
announcement of formation of the government’s task force for its evaluation. While the culture of scientific 
expertise determines the feasibility of the project, the interests of politicians seem to dominate policy decisions. 
Impact of Global Capital 
Such a mega project cannot be completed with national funds currently at the disposal of the government. The 
huge expenditure implicit in it will likely create fiscal problems that are difficult to manage, stressing the 
economy. The maintenance cost and physical position of the dams, canals, tunnels, and captive electric power 
generation created as capital assets under the plan will involve huge financial burdens. This implies the need for 
the private sector, as well as global capital agencies, to be involved in the project. The Indian economy cannot 
finance such an enormous project on its own. To meet the estimated budget of Rs. 5,60,000 crores ($122.7 
billion), financing dependent on private sources, the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank is likely to 
affect the economic and political independence of the nation. Such a process entails the challenge of having to 
abandon regulatory regimes and allow the market to make decisions over water resources under the influence of 
the World Bank. If implemented, such a plan should be self-sustaining so that, if the loan liabilities remain 
unpaid, the creditor banks do not use it to force entry into India and consolidate the control of foreign interests 
over the national economy. 
Transnational corporations see the privatization of water resources as a wonderful opportunity to make 
money. Taking advantage of this plight, Coca-Cola has gone into India and bought rights to a huge water 
system. Coca-Cola is asking local people to pay royalties for access to water (Barlow 2002). The fact that Texan 
power engineers led by Sam Kannappan are lobbying the United States to persuade the World Bank to support 
the scheme speaks volumes about the vested interests of private groups seeking participation in the interlinking 
river project (Pearce 2003). Mobilization of global capital may ultimately entail the risk of abandoning social 
welfare measures while allowing capitalist forces to take its place, using the logic of the market to undermine 
societal welfare. 
Risk Assessment 
The water surplus during July–October in the donor area of the Ganga-Brahmaputra basin is not available at the 
time needed (January–May) in the peninsular rivers recipient area. Utilizing surplus waters, therefore, will 
require enormous holding reservoirs; the direct transfer of surplus water is not possible. In spite of all 
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conventional safety designs in building dams and reservoirs, the element of risk cannot be ignored where human 
interaction with large ecosystems is taking place on such a massive scale. M. Tully (2003) described the 
impacts on human activities as the most valid argument against the project. Reductions in flooding by diversion 
of water will cause reductions in land fertility and promote desertification. Reduction in flows of rivers as a 
result of diversion of water will reduce purging of pollutant concentrations in certain river stretches and 
intensify water pollution there. Such transformations will also impose ecological risks of a nature that are bound 
to have unprecedented effects. To secure the National Water Grid, the interlink infrastructure will also require 
unprecedented security arrangements and enormous resources, stretching defense and police forces thin. The 
construction of dams and excavation of thousands of kilometers of canals will cause massive population 
displacement. Dams will flood towns and canals will make villages disappear by cutting through thousands of 
kilometers of fertile land, leaving millions to a life of uncertainty. Does the present government have the right to 
impose these uncertain risks on society? A project that envisages connecting the peninsular rivers will create a 
human disaster to rival Mohammed Tughlak’s shifting of the capital from Delhi to Daulatabad in the fourteenth 
century (Reddy 2002). 
Technological Challenges 
Basically, the interlinking project aims to transfer floodwaters of the Ganga and Brahmaputra river basins to the 
peninsular areas of South India. There are three options to accomplish such transfer of surplus water. First is the 
“canal option” to construct lengthy canals for the purpose; second, the “tunnel option” allows water to flow 
under mountains; and third is the “pumping option” that will transfer water over mountains by pumping. An 
analysis of the engineering options to deal with these challenges in trying to implement the project does not 
seem to be an easy task (Vombatkere 2003).  
Canals: A canal running along topographical contours will allow water flow in a unidirectional manner. The 
donor states will accept this proposition only. Interstate transfer of water will be problematic and issues of inter-
river transfer of water cannot be easily resolved. Canals will interfere with the natural flow of water and divert 
part of the flow alongside their embankments as they cut through intersecting watercourses. Canals will 
function as catchbasins, easily becoming filled with silt and residue that will reduce their capacity, requiring 
regular dredging. Trees and other vegetation will tend to grow profusely in this water-rich zone, necessitating 
regular bank clearance work to maintain structural integrity of the canal system. 
Furthermore, canals will cause sociological division between upstream and downstream users. People will have 
to take long routes to cross over to the other side for grazing livestock, trade, or social interactions. The cost of 
construction of roads and bridges for such purposes will be huge. The diversion of water will reduce its 
availability in the Ganga delta region, causing decreased agricultural produce and degradation of fertile land, 
inducing destitution among farmers there. The land required for two hundred meter wide canals, with total 
length of 14,900 km, will amount to 2,980 sq km. Excavation of earth would be not less than 4,000 sq km; land 
lost due to inundation behind dams could be about 8,000 sq km (Vombatkere 2003). The process of land 
acquisition and resettlement will be so huge that it will take decades to complete. Even after twenty-five years, 
refugees from the Karnataka Dam await the award of compensation and those from the Damodar Valley Project 
ousters still lament it after fifty years. Such issues will generate stiff opposition by displaced and otherwise 
affected people, likely making it impossible to accomplish the job in time. 
Pumping: Pumping water over the Vindhya Mountains can transfer the Ganga-Brahmaputra water and its 
tributaries to regions in the south. The Ganga-Brahmaputra floodplains are about ten meters above mean sea 
level (MSL). The Vindhya Mountains are about 300 m above MSL, separating the floodplains of the north from 
the Deccan Plateau, which is 250 m above MSL (Vombatkere 2003). The electric power required to pump water 
to such heights will be close to the current power generation of the entire nation.  
Tunneling: Tunneling tens of kilometers would involve a huge expenditure. The fiscal accounting of 
interlinking rivers makes this option uneconomical. Thus the technological options envisaged have both 
economic as well as socio-environmental consequences to deal with. 
Implications for Conflicts 
A major assumption of this project by the government of India is based on its conviction that, given the problem 
of water availability in the region, all states will cooperate and this will not entail any intra-state or interstate 
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conflict. Inter-basin transfers and supply sharing of basin water to fulfill the needs of states in terms of 
irrigation, hydropower generation, municipal and industrial uses, and navigation and transport have been a 
diplomatic factor since ancient times, since water is a hydrological unit that transcends national and state 
boundaries. Thus, water supply sharing between and within river basins often leads to political and economic 
conflict. India has twenty-four river basins, big and small, and the sharing of water supplies; constructions of 
storage, dams, and canals; and problems of pollution load have remained controversial issues in both intra-state 
and interstate relations in South Asia. 
Competing demands for water in a region hosting half of the world’s poor and one-fifth of the world’s 
population, coupled with problems of urbanization and sanitation, make supplying clear, healthy water a 
difficult proposition. The emergence of regional parties and coalition governments has fanned popular regional 
sentiments against important national interests. Problems have arisen in Punjab over supply sharing; an existing 
controversy prevails between Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh, all fanned by the politicization of 
this resource (Garg 1999).  
The National Water Development Agency (NWDA) has studied the resources of different basins, assessing 
availability for the transfer of surplus in the Mahanadi - Godavari - Krishna - Pennar - Cauvery links and 
diverting the west flowing rivers of Kerala and Karnataka eastward, though it is difficult to persuade Orissa and 
Andhra Pradesh that there is surplus in the Mahanadi or the Godavari. 
Another major issue to contend with is the legal status of water. In the constitution of India, water is subject 
to state control, with the national government allowed to intervene only in the regulation and development of 
interstate rivers to the extent it is declared by the parliament to be a situation that is in public interest. Under 
Article 262, the government of India created the Interstate Water Disputes Act of 1956 to solve interstate 
problems, but water has become increasingly politicized on a regional and linguistic basis. Because of the 
nature of multiparty coalitions, regional interests can prevent central intervention in issues like those of the 
Krishna and Cauvery water disputes. Given that the National Water Resource Council of India has met only 
three times since 1987, the limited ability of the council to solve national river problems can well be 
understood.  
Even managing water within one river basin can bring states into conflict. Envisaging the interlinking of 
ten rivers passing through twenty-five states and involving issues of riparian rights between competing nation 
states may indeed be all set for a modern Mahabharata fought over water.* In India, ground water user rights 
are provided to land owners and there is a general notion that surface water is for consumption locally by user 
right. Riparian rights are seldom honored. Given this socio-cultural view of water rights, other realistic water 
sharing scenarios have the potential to exacerbate conflicts, inflate water problems, and present nearly insoluble 
challenges to interstate and inter-country water sharing. For example, riparian rights and their enforcement are 
at the root of the previously mentioned disputes involving sharing Cauvery River waters between Karnataka and 
Tamil Nadu, as well as many of those amongst other states of the nation. If Indians are unable to solve conflicts 
arising within a basin to share a river, large-scale inter-basin transfers of water by interlinking rivers may lead 
to water conflicts on an unprecedented scale. 
Even in the international context, supply sharing has been a matter of big vs. small, with problems over 
supply in Nepal, Bangladesh, and India. In issues of inter-basin transfers, such diversions do indeed cause the 
liveliest concerns, often leading to protests and resistance in the exporting region sparked by the elemental 
importance of water for life and the economy (Verghese 1990).  
A similar concern has been voiced in the case of the Himalayan basin. A major concern of Indian experts 
has been to try and harness the Brahmaputra River by a link canal passing through Bangladesh. This scheme 
would take the river westwards and southwards to water-deficient regions elsewhere in India. The mighty 
Brahmaputra River flows in a remote corner of the country, then drains the bulk of its water into the Bay of 
Bengal without it being tapped as a water resource. A desire to transfer these flows to areas of high water 
demand and scarcity seems natural. An initial Indian proposal to Bangladesh in the 1970s, proposing the 
construction of a gigantic Brahmaputra-Ganga gravity link canal—originating at Jogiphopa in Assam, 
traversing through Bangladesh, and feeding into the Ganga above Farakka—was summarily rejected by 
Bangladesh for many reasons. An alternative link canal through the Siliguri “chicken neck” would involve large 
                                                           
* The Mahabharata, a famous ancient Sanskrit epic poem of India, chronicles a civil war between Indo-Aryan kings. 
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lifts that present formidable engineering challenges and is not economically viable. Brahmaputra water is likely 
to remain out of bounds. 
Off and on, Bangladesh has contemplated a Brahmaputra–Ganga transfer within its own territory. Nepal 
has likewise identified certain water-deficient zones that might at some stage import water from surplus basins. 
But the question remains—how far is this supply sharing practical in view of the geopolitical, physical, and 
economic realities of the region? The sharing of basin waters is preconditioned on mutual understanding, data 
sharing, and resolution of differences over water use and sharing within and between basins, as well as finding 
the will to cooperate. 
The Garland Canal, proposed to connect the Ganga in the north to the Cauvery River in the far south, also 
has international ramifications. Under a December 1996 Indo-Bangladesh treaty on the sharing of Ganga water, 
India has undertaken to protect the flows arriving at Farakka. The Ganga basin is water-short in the dry season. 
Even if India argues that it will only store flood flows for release in the dry season, Bangladesh feels skeptical 
that the treaty, in letter and spirit, will be honored. On the other hand, West Bengal still pleads for greater water 
flows to sustain its Calcutta Port and feels its interests were bartered away when the national government signed 
the Indo-Bangladesh Treaty on Ganga waters. Will it be politically wise to tamper with Ganga waters at 
Farakka to augment supply to Hooghly, precipitating a diplomatic row with Bangladesh on the issue of 
desertification of fertile land and the drying of the Sundarbans region? In the case of proposals that involve the 
flows of the Ganga, there is no doubt that water politics will complicate the regional diplomatic environment. 
Periodic floods and droughts already play havoc with the political, social, economic, and environmental 
stability of these sister countries in the Indian sub-continent. In many cases, such problems can be addressed by 
constructing storages, dams, and reservoirs to store floodwaters on the headwaters of shared rivers and later 
release it downstream during droughts. Conflicting demands for a scarce resource such as water make clear that 
cooperation is not easily forthcoming amongst these sub-continental neighbors. In such circumstances, vested 
state interests can obstruct national or regional co-operation. Beyond a doubt, plans to share water supplies in 
international and domestic basins remain a political and diplomatic challenge in the wake of increasing 
demands for limited supplies of water. 
Advocacy of the need for integrated planning, development, and management of river basins or watersheds 
can often seem an idealistic proposition. Rivers must be treated under the basin approach that has been 
recognized to be the logical and rational unit for optimum development and utilization of water resources. 
However, hydrological boundaries of river basins often do not follow the political boundaries of states, resulting 
in conflicting interests and divergent priorities for development. Water resource planning needs to be 
formulated with due consideration of the geopolitical problems, in such cases as Himalayan or interstate river 
water resources. India is locked in conflicts both with its neighbors and domestically over water problems. The 
diplomatic relations of India with Nepal and Bangladesh are good, but issues of water that sometimes form part 
of negotiations are a reminder of the influence of relations of other nations vis-à-vis water. Proposals to 
massively interlink rivers are projects with deep interconnections impinging upon relationships between nation 
states sharing river basins.  
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PART FIVE 
Conflicting Overtones 
 
Political Interests, Bureaucratic Positions, and Policy Decisions 
Elected officials and bureaucrats in federal, state, and municipal departments make decisions in public policy. 
However, political interests are often given increased weight when policy makers have to make a decision. W. 
Robinson (1995) emphasizes the desire for reelection as the primary concern of politicians in making a 
decision. Political interests shape politicians’ choices, points of view, final decisions, and even the process 
itself. Plans for a river interlinking project remain in the governmental archives and each time consideration of 
them was re-opened this enigmatic scheme has failed to find approval. The project formed part of the election 
manifesto of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), led by the BJP. Despite its place as a key issue in the 
electoral platform of the NDA, the project still could not take off. The political resolution of the BJP National 
Council Meeting at Nagpur (August 27–28, 2000) urged the government to consider setting a deadline for 
implementation of the river interlinking project. The project also formed part of the document of the ninth plan 
of the government, but could never move beyond the planning stage. In 2001, N. Nandhivarman, General 
Secretary of Dravida Peravai, attempted to initiate action by filing a writ petition in the Supreme Court of India 
(Writ Petition #496, 2001) asking the court to trigger implementation of the project within a specific time 
frame.  
It is customary that the judiciary has deferred to the executive on matters of dams and water policy. Critics 
contend that Justice B.N. Kirpal, on the verge of retirement, pushed the project (Patkar and Arvinda 2002). A 
politically lucrative opportunity was provided by the Supreme Court through its direction to the government to 
set a date for implementation of the plan and the BJP found it an easy ploy to push through its manifesto. 
Common people are taught to accept the verdict of the court as ultimate, conscientious, constitutional, legal, and 
beyond question. The river interlinking project therefore became a fait accompli. Accordingly, Prime Minister 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced a task force for its execution. Such a mega-project, heavily promoted as 
providing water to the common man, has all the makings of a popular electoral issue attracting millions of 
people. Even in the absence of an open debate, water is a sensitive issue that leaves the opposition with no 
option but to espouse the project to prove that it was always supportive of the ruling party in matters of national 
interest. Congress President Sonia Gandhi wrote to the Congress Party’s Chief Ministers in various states in 
support of the project. 
The project serves the Promethean aspirations of bureaucrats and technocrats that form the rank and file of 
the government. According to a government spokesman, the project was given serious consideration even 
before formation of a government task force to study the viability of its implementation. However, it still cannot 
be denied that the project is unlikely to survive careful independent scientific study, despite the fact that the 
state controls the most powerful and persuasive system of evaluation for building public support for the project. 
It has the classified and integrated factual information, nearly unlimited consultation access to experts, 
scientists, technocrats, economists, and social scientists on its exchequer, forming an advisory group to the 
government. This group is responsible for evaluating the merits and demerits of decisions such as approval of a 
mega-project like the interlinking of rivers. However, it can be anticipated that the bureaucracy and technocracy 
will most likely clear the project on technical feasibility and economic viability, despite the abundant evidence 
that these are far from being closed questions. Once a state decision is taken in principle and policy, the 
governmental machinery is geared up for its execution. The Ministry of Water Resources remains a dumping 
ground for ex-bureaucrats that attached themselves to the project as a God-sent opportunity to occupy a frontal 
position in the national political arena.  The hype and value associated with the project, declaring its status as 
being the greatest engineering magnum opus of contemporary times, offers the promise of prominence to 
professionals and administrators in the Ministry of Water Resources. 
The policy discourse of mega-projects is usually axiomatic in approach and explores, inadvertently, a 
paradigm that directs rationale, arguments, and analysis around epistemological outcomes that negate and 
exclude other approaches. In practice, the dominant discourse of the state gradually shapes the innate freedom 
accompanying sectarian politics pursued vigorously by political agency. It evolves in relation to social voices, 
ultimately shaping political agendas. Such dialogue and debate becomes part of the discourse of civil society. It 
can be anticipated that this process is state oriented, even if it is often couched in terms of voicing the interests 
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of society at large in search of legitimacy. Nonetheless, the state seeks accreditation of its aims as part of a 
broader consultative process. 
Agency of Civil Society  
State policy decisions vis-à-vis mega-environmental projects affecting the common citizen often stir criticism 
by civil society. Grassroots groups, NGOs, the scientific and expert community of technocrats, scientists, social 
scientists, and other stakeholders function as civil society actors. Their participation can provide resistance to 
ill-advised state projects in the interest of society at large, because their agency looks at the project from a 
perspective other than the state’s. It seems worthwhile to explore the possibilities for considering transparent 
and unbiased viewpoints to express this agency on the issue of interlinking rivers in an effort to broaden the 
canvas of the debate. The response of civil society in this case is a mixed bag of approval and disapproval. 
Independent scientists and engineers have raised questions over viability of the river interlinking project 
(Goyal 2003). Much of the engineering community seems skeptical about the scheme. Even engineers in 
Karnataka raised doubts about whether the water from the north will ever reach the state (Pearce 2003). They 
recognize that nature has linked water itself in a hydrological cycle. For a balanced hydrological cycle, 
promotion of forest cover, prevention of erosion, enhancement of ground water development in micro-
watersheds, de-siltation and maintenance of existing canals, lakes, ponds, pools, and other water accumulation 
processes are preferable to river interlinking. Many stakeholders have expressed a strong feeling that the plan 
will create conflicts, squander money, and result in increased national political divisions (Khosla and Gujja 
2003). F. Pearce (2003) calls it ill conceived and potentially a cause of water wars with India’s neighbors. The 
former Secretary of the Ministry of Water Resource, Ramaswamy Iyer, dismissed the project as “technological 
hubris” and said India already has incomplete water projects worth billions of dollars that need completion 
before launching others (Iyer 2002). 
M.S. Reddy, another former Secretary of the Ministry of Water Resources, argues that better use of existing 
water resources and increased harvesting of rainfall are viable alternatives to interlinking rivers. Experts raise 
doubts on river linking project (Dasgupta 2003) in the context of frontline issues in water and land management 
policy. Dr. Tushaar Shah, the head of the International Water Management Institute-Tata Water Policy Program 
also expressed doubts on the cost-benefit ratio and pros and cons of the project (Dasgupta 2003). He pointed out 
that the country needs re-orientation of its water management policy, linking it to poverty alleviation programs.  
Environmentalists like Sunderlal Bahguna, Medha Patkar, and Rakesh Jaiswal have voiced their 
reservations against fiddling with nature. The Save Ganga and Narmada movements stand as testimony to the 
concerns of environmentalists and grassroots groups. Patkar and L.S. Arvinda (2002) posed the question, “Will 
a linking of rivers actually prevent drought or merely transfer drought?” Environmentalists also attack the 
interlinking project for its potential to spread pollution between watersheds (Pearce 2003). River antipollution 
movements such as Eco-Friends, Environment India, and Green Friends have expressed critical concerns about 
the transfer of polluted water and its potential to lessen accountability for polluters. The growth of slums in 
Indian cities, a result of villagers driven off their lands by schemes to increase irrigation, power generation, 
railways, and road construction will further intensify due to refugee influx caused by displacement and 
acquisition of land needed for the infrastructure for interlinking rivers. Civil society movements in India will 
definitely contest these displacements, demanding just compensation for these destitute refugees. It will be a 
difficult task to seek concurrence of NGOs on the interlinking issue. 
The opinions expressed above are spontaneous reactions of the civil society and portray a potentially grim 
scenario. However, an evolving discourse of in-depth thinking, discussion, and debate over the issue is the 
present goal of this project. The opposition to large-scale water resource development projects is well-defined 
and embedded in the thinking of civil society networks and organizations. Civil society needs to address itself to 
these issues that require serious consideration: 
• Broadening the debate beyond the limits implicit in the government’s task force vis-à-vis India’s 
traditional supply driven approach to resource management; 
• Mobilization of additional intellectual and other resources to balance the presently skewed nature of the 
task force; 
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• Incorporation of views and aspirations of people that rely on water sector goods and services for 
subsistence or other livelihood purposes and other stakeholders; and 
• Recognition of the task force’s need to foster a broadly-based consensus of opinion on any final plan for 
the river interlinking project 
The project on interlinking rivers is based on the water scarcity paradigm that requires it to build its case 
for legitimacy as the only alternative to replenish the supply gap. If water deficiency has to do with water crisis, 
then why are villages with less than 200 mm of rainfall during summer not water scarce and why does 
Cherrapunji suffer scarcity despite its reputation as one of the wettest places on Earth? While the government 
builds a case for this gargantuan water resource development project, academia remains bogged down in 
voicing how better research and development on effective optimal use of water could compensate for the 
scarcity using low tech, community-based programs for harvesting water. This dichotomy entails the 
assumptions of a naturalist and environmentalist approach versus an epistemological approach pursued by the 
state along a defined course of thinking, utterly disregarding the cooperative community efforts that can turn a 
desert into an oasis. Tarun Bharat Sangh’s work in Rajasthan exemplifies the point.   
However, the axiomatic dictum remains that the country is experiencing an acute shortage of water because 
there is “less water.” An interactive process can alter the concept of “less water availability” into “socially 
experienced” water deficiency that finds alternative measures to combat the problem. Instead of creating a 
phobia and hype of scarcity, the solutions to the critique may be found in “propagating conservation of water,” 
“harvesting of water,” and “development of watersheds.” How do water demands emerge? How are they linked 
with consumption? Why is much water used by a chosen few—the wealthy strata of society—negating it to the 
larger population? Can the technology of large-scale water resource development projects like interlinking 
rivers solve the problem of availability and access to water in India? These are questions that trouble the minds 
of Indian society today. 
The success of interlinking rivers depends on the legitimacy of both its structure and its agency in the 
public’s eye. Is it premature to pass a judgment over whether it is a populist step by government and opposition 
parties to float the project? Has the judiciary overstepped its limits in matters of governmental policy decision? 
Has despair over water availability prompted the impromptu execution of plans to interlink rivers? These 
dilemmas dominate the Interlinking River Project of India, which may have both hope and despair in store. 
Perhaps, the time frame set by the Supreme Court for the government of India’s task force evaluation may offer 
some insight on the path that India treads to manage this common resource for availability, equity, and 
sustainability in the search for water security.  
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Figure 2: River Basins, Water Stress and Water Scarcity 
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Figure 3: Links Envisaged as per the National Perspective Plan 
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